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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Mary Glover (―Glover‖) appeals the District Court‘s 
dismissal of her claims against defendants Mark Udren and 
Udren Law Offices (―Udren‖ or ―Udren Defendants‖) under 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (―FDCPA‖) and 
Pennsylvania‘s Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act 
(―FCEUA‖).  This appeal requires us to flesh out the notice 
requirements inherent in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c), as well as address novel issues of statutory 
interpretation pertaining to each statute.  We will affirm. 
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I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1
 
 In August of 2002, Glover entered into a mortgage 
loan transaction with Washington Mutual Bank (―WaMu‖).  
After suffering injuries from an automobile accident in March 
of 2005, Glover fell behind on her mortgage and requested a 
―work-out‖ agreement to reduce her monthly payments.  
WaMu initially threatened to foreclose on the home, but 
subsequently agreed to postpone her payments until the 
request had been evaluated.  Eventually, on March 14, 2006, 
WaMu denied Glover‘s work-out request. 
 Around this time, Bill Murray, an attorney with Udren 
Law Offices, called Glover and informed her that she owed 
WaMu eleven missed mortgage payments, in addition to 
attorney‘s fees and costs, totaling approximately $3,397.28.  
On April 10, 2006, WaMu filed a Foreclosure Complaint 
against Glover in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County, claiming $12,652.36 on the mortgage and threatening 
foreclosure if Glover did not pay.  The aggregate claim 
included $9,703.57 in principal, $633.71 in interest, $280.00 
in anticipated court costs, $1,250.00 in anticipated attorney‘s 
fees, and various other fees.  Mark Udren of Udren Law 
Offices was counsel of record on WaMu‘s Foreclosure 
Complaint.  No further action took place following this initial 
filing. 
                                              
1
 These facts are derived from Glover‘s original and 
amended pleadings, and assumed to be true in our review of a 
district court‘s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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 After various communications between Glover and 
WaMu‘s assignee, Wells Fargo,2 Glover entered into a Loan 
Modification Agreement (―Agreement‖ or ―Modification 
Agreement‖) with Wells Fargo on January 4, 2008.  The 
Agreement stipulated to unpaid principal in the amount of 
$12,152.02, increased Glover‘s monthly payment, and 
extended the repayment period by six years.  Although 
Glover began making payments under the Agreement soon 
thereafter, the Foreclosure Complaint was not discontinued 
until November 25, 2009. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On June 9, 2008, Glover filed a putative class-action 
Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 
County against WaMu, Wells Fargo, and the Udren 
Defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of the FCEUA, 73 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2270.4(a), premised in turn on broadly 
alleged violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  
The case was removed to the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania on July 14, 2008, and 
motions to dismiss were filed by all defendants. 
                                              
2
 WaMu assigned Glover‘s mortgage loan to Wells 
Fargo on November 15, 2006. 
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 On October 23, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (―FDIC‖), in its capacity as receiver for WaMu,3 
filed a motion for a ninety-day stay for Glover to submit her 
claims against WaMu to the FDIC‘s mandatory claims review 
process.  The motion was granted on October 24, 2008.  On 
January 22, 2009, at the conclusion of the stay, the FDIC 
again moved to stay the proceedings pending completion of 
its review process.  The motion was granted over Glover‘s 
objections on March 20, 2009, and reaffirmed on June 15, 
2009.  On September 24, 2009, the FDIC denied Glover‘s 
claims against WaMu. 
 Glover filed a First Amended Complaint on October 
14, 2009, adding a count against the Udren Defendants for 
FDCPA violations arising out of the Udren Defendants‘ 
alleged failure to voluntarily discontinue the Foreclosure 
Complaint after Glover signed the Modification Agreement.  
(App. at 143a.)  The Udren Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  On June 3, 2010, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a Revised Report recommending dismissal of the 
newly alleged FDCPA claim against the Udren Defendants 
with prejudice. 
                                              
3
 The FDIC was appointed receiver for WaMu on 
September 25, 2008, by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
following a nine-day run on the bank‘s deposits.  See Office 
of Thrift Supervision, OTS Fact Sheet on Washington Mutual 
Bank 3 (Sep. 25, 2008). 
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 On June 9, 2010, Glover filed a Second Amended 
Complaint, adding Goldman Sachs as a defendant and 
restyling, among other claims, the FDCPA claim against the 
Udren Defendants.  (App. at 290a-294a.)  The Magistrate 
Judge vacated the Revised Report to allow filing of the 
Second Amended Complaint, but subsequently reinstated the 
Report.  On August 18, 2010, adopting the Revised Report, 
the District Court entered an order dismissing the First 
Amended Complaint‘s FDCPA and FCEUA counts against 
the Udren Defendants without prejudice, thereby rendering 
the Second Amended Complaint the operative pleading.
4
 
 On October 22, 2010, the Udren Defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  The 
District Court granted the motion as to the FDCPA claim, 
                                              
4
 This was an adroit compromise by the District Court 
to allow the case to proceed in an orderly fashion, and bears 
some significance on appeal.  Notably, the District Court‘s 
dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, though on the 
merits, was not a final, appealable order because it was 
without prejudice.  See Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 
F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that ―an order 
dismissing a complaint without prejudice is ordinarily not 
appealable‖).  Moreover, ―an amended complaint, once filed, 
normally supersedes the antecedent complaint.‖  Connectu 
LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008).  Thus, 
although we are free to affirm on any ground supported by the 
record, Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001), 
the District Court‘s August 18, 2010 order dismissing the 
First Amended Complaint is not before us on appeal. 
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finding that the Amended Complaint was not filed within the 
FDCPA‘s one-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(d), and did not relate back to the timely filed original 
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B).  
The District Court also dismissed Glover‘s FCEUA claims 
against the Udren Defendants, finding that the Udren 
Defendants were not ―debt collectors‖ under the FCEUA 
because Glover‘s mortgage was a purchase money mortgage, 
and hence excluded from the FCEUA‘s definition of ―debt.‖  
See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2270.3.  Glover timely 
appealed. 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Glover‘s 
FDCPA claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and, the matter in 
controversy exceeding $5 million, over the putative class 
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  The District Court 
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Glover‘s FCEUA 
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claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
 
 We exercise plenary review of a district court‘s 
interpretation and application of Rule 15(c), Lundy v. Adamar 
of N.J., Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1177 (3d Cir. 1994), and the 
dismissal of a claim based on the statute of limitations.  Lake 
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2000).  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court‘s dismissal for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), applying the same standard 
as the district court.  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 
452 (3d Cir. 2006).  We must accept all well-pled allegations 
in the complaint as true and ask whether, under any 
reasonable interpretation, the plaintiff states a claim that 
would entitle her to relief.  Id.  Our review of a district court‘s 
interpretation of a state statute is plenary.  Moody’s v. Sec. 
Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992). 
                                              
5
 Because this is an appeal from an order dismissing 
fewer than all of Glover‘s claims against two of the various 
defendants, the parties to this appeal were required to obtain 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that 
the District Court‘s order was final and appealable.  To satisfy 
Rule 54(b), the District Court was required to make an 
express determination that there was ―no just reason for 
delay.‖  Elliot v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Although the initial Rule 54(b) certification was 
perhaps lacking in this regard, the parties obtained a 
supplemental order on July 25, 2012, that satisfies this 
jurisdictional prerequisite. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 Glover appeals the District Court‘s dismissal of her 
FDCPA and FCEUA claims against the Udren Defendants.  
We address each claim in turn. 
A.  FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 
 The District Court treated the FDCPA claim against 
the Udren Defendants as accruing on January 4, 2008, the 
date on which the Modification Agreement was signed.  
Although the FDCPA imposes a one-year statute of 
limitations from the date of the alleged violation, Glover filed 
her First Amended Complaint, in which she first presented 
this claim, on October 14, 2009.  Glover argued that the claim 
was timely because it related back to her original Complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B), or, in the 
alternative, because the statute of limitations was tolled 
during the FDIC‘s mandatory review of her claims against 
WaMu.  The District Court found that Glover‘s First 
Amended Complaint bore ―absolutely no connection‖ to her 
original claims against the Udren Defendants, and therefore 
rejected Glover‘s relation back argument.  And after 
―generously‖ accounting for the stays issued in response to 
the FDIC claims review process, the District Court calculated 
that the statute of limitations expired on October 9, 2009, five 
days before Glover filed her First Amended Complaint. 
 On appeal, Glover submits that the District Court erred 
in finding that her amended FDCPA claim against the Udren 
Defendants did not relate back to her original Complaint.  She 
also argues that the District Court erred in calculating the 
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statute of limitations by using the incorrect accrual date for 
her claim and by failing to toll the statute of limitations for 
the proper length of time. 
1.  Relation Back 
Glover initially contends that the District Court erred 
in finding that her amended FDCPA claim against the Udren 
Defendants did not relate back to her original Complaint. 
Despite the presence of overlapping facts between the two 
pleadings, we reach the same result because Glover‘s original 
pleading failed to give fair notice to the Udren Defendants of 
her subsequently amended claim. 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B), an 
amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the 
original pleading where ―the amendment asserts a claim or 
defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the 
original pleading.‖  Relation back is structured ―to balance 
the interests of the defendant protected by the statute of 
limitations with the preference expressed in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for 
resolving disputes on their merits.‖  Krupski v. Costa 
Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494 (2010).  Where an 
amendment relates back, Rule 15(c) allows a plaintiff to 
sidestep an otherwise-applicable statute of limitations, 
thereby permitting resolution of a claim on the merits, as 
opposed to a technicality.  See id.  At the same time, Rule 
15(c) endeavors to preserve the important policies served by 
the statute of limitations – most notably, protection against 
the prejudice of having to defend against a stale claim, as well 
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as society‘s general interest in security and stability – by 
requiring ―that the already commenced action sufficiently 
embraces the amended claims.‖  Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
60 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 1995). 
As we have explained, application of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) 
normally entails a ―search for a common core of operative 
facts in the two pleadings.‖  Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 
F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004).  Importantly, however, Rule 
15(c) is not merely an ―identity of transaction test,‖ such as 
the rules governing joinder of claims or parties.  6A Charles 
Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 1497 (2010).  Though not expressly 
stated, it is well-established that the touchstone for relation 
back is fair notice, because Rule 15(c) is premised on the 
theory that ―a party who has been notified of litigation 
concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the 
notice that statutes of limitations were intended to provide.‖  
Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n.3 
(1984); Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310.  Thus, only where the 
opposing party is given ―fair notice of the general fact 
situation and the legal theory upon which the amending party 
proceeds‖ will relation back be allowed.  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 
310.  Conversely, amendments ―that significantly alter the 
nature of a proceeding by injecting new and unanticipated 
claims are treated far more cautiously.‖  United States v. 
Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
In Bensel, we approved relation back of amendments 
that ―restate the original claim with greater particularity or 
amplify the factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent 
conduct.‖  387 F.3d at 310.  In that case, the plaintiff‘s broad 
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allegations of breach of a duty of fair representation in the 
original complaint easily encompassed the ―more 
particularized claims‖ alleged in the amended pleading, and 
the defendant was therefore ―unquestionably on notice that it 
would be held liable for every possible breach of its fair 
representation duty occasioned by the outlined facts.‖  Id.  
Thus, the facts in Bensel fit squarely within the contours of 
Rule 15(c)(1)(B), and gave us no opportunity to speak to the 
limits imposed by the notice requirement. 
We do so now:  where the original pleading does not 
give a defendant ―fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s [amended] 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,‖ the purpose of 
the statute of limitations has not been satisfied and it is ―not 
an original pleading that [can] be rehabilitated by invoking 
Rule 15(c).‖  Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 149 n.3 (internal marks 
and citation omitted); see 6A Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1497 (―Although not expressly mentioned in the 
rule, . . . courts also inquire into whether the opposing party 
has been put on notice regarding the claim or defense raised 
by the amended pleading.  Only if the pleading has performed 
that function . . . will the amendment be allowed to relate 
back . . . .‖).  Put another way, the underlying question for a 
Rule 15(c) analysis is ―whether the original complaint 
adequately notified the defendants of the basis for liability the 
plaintiffs would later advance in the amended complaint.‖  
Meijer, Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 533 F.3d 857, 866 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (emphasis added); see Wilson v. Fairchild Republic 
Co., 143 F.3d 733, 738 (2d Cir. 1998) (―The pertinent 
inquiry, in this respect, is whether the original complaint gave 
the defendant fair notice of the newly alleged claims.‖ (citing 
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Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 149. n.3)), overruled on other grounds 
by Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 227-28 (2d Cir. 
2006) (adopting de novo standard of review for Rule 15(c)). 
 Here, we cannot agree that Glover‘s original 
Complaint adequately notified the Udren Defendants of the 
basis for liability asserted against them in the amended 
FDCPA claim because it did not arise from the factual 
occurrences which, fairly construed, implicated the Udren 
Defendants in her first pleading.  Glover‘s amended FDCPA 
claim specifically averred that the Udren Defendants violated 
the FDCPA by ―failing to withdraw the Foreclosure 
Complaint against Ms. Glover‖ after Glover signed the 
Modification Agreement, because the Foreclosure Complaint 
constituted a ―continuing representation‖ that Glover had 
defaulted on and had not yet paid her mortgage debt.  (App. at 
257a-58a, 290a-93a (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 57-58, 179-90).)  
Glover‘s original Complaint, by comparison, alleged no such 
conduct by the Udren Defendants.  In fact, amongst the 
plethora of allegations made in Glover‘s 40-page and 139-
paragraph Complaint, Glover accused the Udren Defendants 
only of making a debt-collection phone call and of filing a 
Foreclosure Complaint demanding payment of purportedly 
unlawful attorney‘s fees.  Both of these ―communications‖ or 
―representations‖ would constitute violations of the FDCPA 
that are factually and legally distinct from each other and 
from the amended claim, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting 
―any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt‖), and could 
neither offer ―fair notice of the general fact situation‖ nor of 
the ―legal theory‖ upon which Glover ‗s amended FDCPA 
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claim relied.  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310.  In other words, 
Glover‘s amended FDCPA claim differed in ―time and type‖ 
from the claims earlier alleged against the Udren Defendants.  
See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 657-59 (2005); Oja v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(adding allegation of publication of private information in 
violation of Privacy Act did not relate back to earlier 
complaint alleging publication of same information, but at a 
different time and from a different URL address). 
 We acknowledge, as we must, that the District Court 
arguably mischaracterized the relationship between Glover‘s 
original and amended FDCPA claims as bearing ―absolutely 
no connection.‖  Buried amidst Glover‘s excruciatingly and 
often excessively detailed pleading (so much so that it 
apparently evaded the eyes of the District Court), and 
presented almost as an afterthought, Paragraph 53 averred 
that: 
―Although the monetary claims in Washington 
Mutual‘s Foreclosure Complaint have now long 
been resolved as a result of Wells Fargo‘s and 
Ms. Glover‘s January 4, 2008 loan 
modification, neither Washington Mutual nor 
Wells Fargo have withdrawn that Complaint.  
Thus, the now existing public record shows that 
Washington Mutual is pursuing a claim for well 
over $12,652.36 that, according to Wells 
Fargo‘s January []4, 2008 agreement is neither 
due nor owing.  This again is a form of ‗double 
billing.‘‖ 
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(App. at 57a-58a (Compl. ¶ 53)) (emphasis added).  As 
Glover observes, Paragraph 53 of the original Complaint 
referenced the Modification Agreement and the Foreclosure 
Complaint, both of which pertain to her amended FDCPA 
claim against the Udren Defendants.  Yet factual overlap 
alone is not enough, because the original complaint must have 
given fair notice of the amended claim to qualify for relation 
back under Rule 15(c).  See, e.g., Mayle, 545 U.S. at 658-59 
(listing cases in which amended claim did not relate back for 
lack of fair notice despite presence of overlapping facts); 
Meijer, 533 F.3d at 866 (―Although the original and amended 
claims have some elements and facts in common, the whole 
thrust of the amendments is to fault [defendants], and to fault 
them for conduct different from that identified in the original 
complaint.‖). 
 Fair notice was lacking here.  Just as Rule 8(a) requires 
that a complaint ―be presented with clarity sufficient to avoid 
requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift 
through its pages in search‖ of the nature of the plaintiff‘s 
claim, Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990), 
Rule 15(c) cannot save a complaint that obscures the factual 
predicate and legal theory of the amended claim.  See Bensel, 
387 F.3d at 310; Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1014-15 (relation back 
does not permit a plaintiff to perform an ―end-run‖ around the 
statute of limitations).  Pleadings are not like magic tricks, 
where a plaintiff can hide a claim with one hand, only to pull 
it from her hat with the other.  Here, the facts alleged in 
Paragraph 53 appeared entirely peripheral to the Complaint‘s 
central allegations concerning WaMu and Wells Fargo‘s 
direct communications with Glover and, even under the most 
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generous reading, gave no suggestion that the Udren 
Defendants were culpable in any way for the conduct 
attributed to WaMu or Wells Fargo.  Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(c)(1)(C) (requiring satisfaction of Rule 15(c)(1)(B) and 
notice to the new defendant for relation back where ―the 
amendment changes the party . . . against whom a claim is 
asserted‖); Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1014-15 (discussing importance 
of notice requirement in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)). 
 Nor did Glover‘s sweeping allegation in Count IV of 
the original Complaint – that ―Debt collectors that make false 
representations about the ‗character, amount or legal status of 
any debt‘ violate the FDCPA, § 1692e(2)(A),‖ (App. at 72a 
(Compl. ¶ 110)) – provide clarity.  The facts alleged in Count 
IV described only Wells Fargo‘s purportedly deficient notices 
and letters to Glover, and Glover‘s wholesale incorporation of 
the previous 106 paragraphs illuminated neither the acts that 
constituted ―false representations‖ nor the defendants liable 
for those acts.  The absence of any limit in the application of 
Rule 15(c) to such expansive pleadings ―could cause 
defendants‘ liability to increase geometrically and their 
defensive strategy to become far more complex long after the 
statute of limitations had run.‖  Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1015 
(quoting Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 
1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 Perhaps, by making several inferential leaps, the Udren 
Defendants might have guessed that, hidden between the 
factual allegations and the unmoored recitation of the 
FDCPA, a claim might be asserted against them for the 
conduct attributed to Wells Fargo and WaMu.  But the 
Federal Rules do not place the onus on the defendant to piece 
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together the disparate fragments of a disjointed complaint to 
distill the essence of a claim.  Courts frown on ―pleading by 
means of obfuscation,‖ Jennings, 910 F.2d at 1436, because a 
pleading that is ―prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for 
the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it 
difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation.‖  
Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 
776 (7th Cir. 1994).  Glover could have given some clue in 
her original pleading that the Udren Defendants were 
complicit in failing to discontinue the Foreclosure Complaint, 
and therefore liable for that false representation.  She did not.  
―Although the relation-back rule ameliorates the effect of 
statutes of limitations, it does not save the claims of 
complainants who have sat on their rights.‖  Nelson, 60 F.3d 
at 1015 (internal citation omitted).  The fair notice required 
by Rule 15(c) was lacking, and accordingly, we agree with 
the District Court that Glover‘s amended FDCPA claim 
against the Udren Defendants does not qualify for relation 
back. 
2.  Statute of Limitations 
 Having rejected Glover‘s relation back argument, we 
turn to her arguments concerning the District Court‘s 
calculation of timeliness.  A claim under the FDCPA ―may be 
brought . . . within one year from the date on which the 
violation occurs.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1962k(d).  Glover first 
contends that the District Court erred in finding that her claim 
accrued on the date the Modification Agreement was signed, 
as opposed to the date that the Udren Defendants learned of 
the existence of the Modification Agreement.  She then 
argues that the District Court improperly calculated the 
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running of the statute of limitations during the period that her 
claims against WaMu were being reviewed by the FDIC, 
pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (―FIRREA‖), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 Stat. 183 (incorporated in various United States Code 
provisions).  As did the District Court, we reject Glover‘s 
arguments. 
a.  Accrual of the Claim 
 We are not persuaded that the Udren Defendants‘ 
alleged violation of the FDCPA occurred only after learning 
of the Modification Agreement.  The FDCPA is generally 
characterized as a ―strict liability‖ statute because ―it imposes 
liability without proof of an intentional violation.‖  Allen ex 
rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 & n.7 
(3d Cir. 2011); accord Ellis v. Solomon & Solomon, P.C., 591 
F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (―To recover damages under the 
FDCPA, a consumer does not need to show intentional 
conduct on the part of the debt collector.‖).  Section 
1692e(2)(A), which makes it unlawful for a debt collector, ―in 
connection with the collection of any debt,‖ to make a ―false 
representation‖ about the ―character, amount or legal status of 
any debt,‖ is no different.  The language of this provision 
creates a straightforward, objective standard.  Nothing 
suggests that an allowance is to be made for a defendant‘s 
lack of knowledge or intent.  And notably, recognizing the 
accrual of a claim only upon the intentional violation of the 
FDPCA would undermine the ―deterrent effect of strict 
liability,‖ Allen, 629 F.3d at 368, despite our obligation to 
construe the statute broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose.  
See Brown, 464 F.3d at 453. 
 21 
 In this case, Glover characterized her claim as a ―false 
representation‖ that she had not paid her debt, when, in fact, 
the Modification Agreement and her subsequent payments 
had taken her debt out of default.  The representation that 
Glover had not paid her debt was false, regardless of whether 
the Udren Defendants knew it to be so.  And although Glover 
suggests that her claim was for a ―continuing representation,‖ 
as opposed to a one-time communication, at no point does the 
FDCPA make such a distinction. 
 Glover relies on the language of the FDCPA‘s ―bona 
fide error‖ defense in asserting that the violation must be 
intentional, but her argument is misplaced.  Under the bona 
fide error defense, ―[a] debt collector may not be held liable 
. . . if the debt collector shows . . . that the violation was not 
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid any such error.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c); see 
Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(listing elements of bona fide error defense).  The text of 
§ 1692k(c) cuts against the very interpretation that Glover 
offers: by immunizing a debt collector for an unintentional 
violation where reasonable error-avoidance procedures have 
been employed, § 1692k(c) indicates that a violation of the 
FDCPA does not have to be intentional in the first place.  An 
interpretation of the FDCPA that required an intentional 
violation would, of course, render this language pure 
surplusage, a path which we decline to take.  See, e.g., TRW 
Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
 Although, in certain situations, some courts have 
determined that the FDCPA‘s statute of limitations begins to 
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run on the date of ―the debt collector‘s ‗last opportunity to 
comply with the Act,‘‖ Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 
(9th Cir. 1997) (brackets omitted) (quoting Mattson v. U.S. 
West Commc’ns, Inc., 967 F.2d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1992)), the 
premise for such decisions is lacking here.  An accrual date 
based on the moment the violation becomes intentional 
(which Glover defines by reference to the bona fide error 
defense) fails to provide ―a date which may be ‗fixed by 
objective and visible standards,‘ one which is easy to 
determine, ascertainable by both parties, and may be easily 
applied.‖  Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261.  The question of when a 
defendant learns that his conduct violates the FDCPA, in spite 
of ―procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such error,‖ 15 
U.S.C. § 1692k(c), requires qualitative assessments of 
whether a procedure is ―reasonably adapted.‖  And if a 
defendant lacks such a defense, a court would have to make a 
subjective estimate of when the defendant should have 
learned of the violation.  Accordingly, we agree with the 
District Court that Glover‘s claim arose on the date that the 
Modification Agreement was signed and the representation 
about her debt became objectively false:  January 4, 2008.
6
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 Thus, it is of no moment that the date that the Udren 
Defendants purportedly learned of the Modification 
Agreement, March 3, 2008, was absent from the record when 
the District Court rendered its decision. 
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b.  Tolling Under FIRREA‘s Mandatory 
Exhaustion Requirement 
 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 
(incorporated in various United States Code provisions), 
imposes exhaustion requirements on claims asserted against a 
failed financial institution for which the FDIC is appointed 
receiver.  See FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 
129, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1991); Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 
1151-55 (1st Cir. 1992).  Under FIRREA, the FDIC, in its 
capacity as receiver, ―may resolve claims against the failed 
institution.‖  Shain, 944 F.2d at 132 (citing 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(d)(4) & (5)).  The FDIC‘s review of a claim presents a 
jurisdictional bar to federal courts, because ―Congress 
expressly withdrew jurisdiction from all courts over any 
claim to a failed bank‘s assets that are made outside‖ the 
FDIC claims process.  Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6), 
(d)(13)(D)).  Consequently, ―in order to obtain jurisdiction to 
bring a claim in federal court, one must exhaust 
administrative remedies by submitting the claim to the 
receiver in accordance with the administrative scheme for 
adjudicating claims detailed in § 1821(d).‖  Nat’l Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. City Sav., F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 
383 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 Based on this exhaustion requirement, Glover argues 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the litigation 
for the entire period during which the FDIC, as receiver for 
WaMu, had jurisdiction to review her claims against the bank.  
In calculating the timeliness of Glover‘s claim, however, the 
District Court simply added up the days during which the 
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Court was deprived of jurisdiction due to various non-
contiguous stays and then added those days to the FDCPA‘s 
one-year limitations period, effectively extending the 
limitations period by 200 days.
7
  Glover therefore contends 
that the District Court should also have included a period 
between the stays (from January 24, 2009 until March 20, 
2009) during which the FDIC‘s review process was 
purportedly in motion. 
 Although Glover does not frame it as such, we 
understand her jurisdictional argument as an attempt to justify 
the application of equitable tolling.  The doctrine of equitable 
tolling ―can rescue a claim otherwise barred as untimely by a 
statute of limitations [only] when a plaintiff has been 
prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently 
inequitable circumstances.‖  Santos ex rel. Beato v. United 
States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Equitable tolling is extended only 
sparingly, in circumstances ―(1) where the defendant has 
actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of 
action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has 
been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where 
the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in 
the wrong forum.‖  Id.  Although tolling the statute of 
                                              
7
 FIRREA permits a receiver to request an initial 90-
day stay under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A), and requires that 
a determination to allow or disallow a claim be made within 
the 180-day period after the filing of the claim with the 
receiver under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).  See Marquis, 
965 F.2d at 1151-55. 
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limitations for the requested period would be more than 
adequate to render her FDCPA claim timely, Glover is not 
entitled to equitable tolling by virtue of FIRREA‘s exhaustion 
requirement. 
 First, we need not venture into FIRREA‘s intricate 
statutory web to determine that Glover‘s claim against the 
Udren Defendants was not subject to a jurisdictional bar.  To 
the extent that it pertains to Glover‘s suit, FIRREA‘s 
jurisdictional bar governs solely ―(1) claims for payment from 
the assets of [the failed bank], (2) actions for payment from 
those assets and (3) actions for a determination of rights with 
respect to those assets.‖  Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 
F.2d 383, 393 (3d Cir. 1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i).  
Glover‘s claim against the Udren Defendants was not a claim 
against a failed bank, to obtain payment from bank assets, or 
for a determination of rights with respect to those assets.  She 
was not obligated to submit the claim to the FDIC, nor 
obligated to sit on her hands while the FDIC processed her 
claims against WaMu.  We reject this argument accordingly. 
 Second, even if we were to apply FIRREA‘s 
jurisdictional bar to these claims, we agree with the First 
Circuit‘s well-reasoned opinion in Marquis that when a bank 
fails after a claim is filed in federal court, the jurisdictional 
bar does not apply.  The text of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), Marquis 
held, ―show[s] Congress‘[s] discernible intent to preserve 
jurisdiction over civil actions filed against failed institutions 
prior to the FDIC‘s appointment as receiver.‖  965 F.2d at 
1153; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii) (―the filing of a 
claim with the receiver shall not prejudice any right of the 
claimant to continue any action which was filed before the 
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appointment of the receiver‖ (emphasis added)).  In those 
circumstances, a district court may stay the proceedings upon 
request ―so as to permit exhaustion of the mandatory 
administrative claims review process,‖ but retains jurisdiction 
over the litigation, to resume if needed at the conclusion of 
the stay.  Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1155; see 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(d)(12)(A) (―After the appointment of [a receiver,] the 
. . . receiver may request a stay . . . .‖).  Glover filed her 
original Complaint in state court on June 9, 2008, and it was 
removed to the District Court on July 14, 2008.  The FDIC 
was appointed receiver for WaMu on September 25, 2008.  
Because the FDIC‘s receivership began after the case was 
removed to the District Court, the essence of the jurisdictional 
argument rings hollow. 
 Although there may have been some time periods that 
Glover was prevented from filing her FDCPA claims against 
the Udren Defendants because proceedings were stayed, there 
is no reason why the statute of limitations should be tolled by 
more than 200 days.  Thus, we find no error in the District 
Court‘s determination that Glover‘s FDCPA claim was not 
timely. 
B.  FAIR CREDIT EXTENSION UNIFORMITY ACT 
 The FCEUA, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2270.1 et seq., 
prohibits ―unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices with regard to the collection of 
debts,‖ id. § 2270.2, including any violation of the FDCPA by 
a ―debt collector.‖  Id. § 2270.4(a).  Though premised on the 
same alleged FDCPA violation, the FCEUA imposes a two-
year statute of limitations under which Glover‘s claim would 
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have been timely.  Id. § 2270.5(b).  Nevertheless, the District 
Court found that the Udren Defendants were not ―debt 
collectors,‖ and consequently that Glover failed to state a 
FCEUA claim against the Udren Defendants. 
 We will affirm the District Court, though on different 
grounds.  There can be no dispute that, based on the facts 
alleged in the pleadings, the Udren Defendants qualify as 
―debt collectors‖ under the FDCPA.8  Whether a defendant is 
                                              
8
 A ―debt collector‖ under the FDCPA includes ―any 
person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce 
or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is 
the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or 
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due 
or asserted to be owed or due another.‖  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692a(6).  Before the filing of the Foreclosure Complaint, 
an associate at Udren Law Offices called Glover requesting 
immediate payment on her mortgage debt.  Furthermore, 
attorneys that ―regularly, through litigation, tr[y] to collect 
consumer debts‖ are considered debt collectors under that 
Act.  Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995); FTC v. 
Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 172 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007).  
In filing the Foreclosure Complaint against Glover, the Udren 
Defendants self-identified as a ―debt collector‖ and confirmed 
that the Foreclosure Complaint was ―an attempt to collect a 
debt,‖ and Glover‘s pleadings allege that the Udren 
Defendants engaged in such litigation as a common debt 
collection practice.  We therefore have no hesitation in 
concluding that the Udren Defendants meet the FDCPA 
definition of ―debt collector.‖ 
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a ―debt collector‖ under the FCEUA, however, is somewhat 
more complicated, because rather than adopting the FDCPA‘s 
definition of ―debt collector,‖ the FCEUA provides its own.  
Under the FCEUA, a ―debt collector‖ is ―[a] person not a 
creditor . . . engaging or aiding directly or indirectly in 
collecting a debt . . . .‖  Id. § 2270.3.  The FCEUA includes 
within this definition ―[a]n attorney, whenever such attorney 
attempts to collect a debt, as herein defined, except in 
connection with the filing or service of pleadings or discovery 
or the prosecution of a lawsuit to reduce a debt to judgment.‖  
Id. § 2270.3(3)(iii).  This is narrower than the FDCPA 
definition of ―debt collector.‖  See FTC v. Check Investors, 
Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 172 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007) (―Attorneys who 
regularly engage in debt collection or debt collection 
litigation are covered by the FDCPA, and their litigation 
activities must comply with the requirements of the 
FDCPA.‖).  Thus, even where a defendant ostensibly falls 
within the FDCPA‘s definition of ―debt collector,‖ such 
defendant may not be liable under the FCEUA‘s narrower 
scope.
9
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 Glover suggests that we should not read the 
FCEUA‘s definition of ―debt collector‖ to exclude from 
liability conduct prohibited by the FDCPA because doing so 
would contravene the purpose of incorporating the federal 
statute.  However, our obligation is not to redraft statutes as 
we might think they should be crafted, but to give meaning to 
each provision as it is presently written.  1 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 1921(a).  In doing so, we adhere to the plain meaning 
of the text.  Id. § 1921(b).  Rather than stating that the 
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 The Udren Defendants‘ activities were clearly ―in 
connection with . . . the prosecution of a lawsuit to reduce a 
debt to judgment,‖ and so the Udren Defendants are not ―debt 
collectors‖ under the FCEUA.  See Silva v. MidAtlantic 
Mgmt. Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  We 
therefore agree with the District Court that Glover‘s FCEUA 
claims against the Udren Defendants must fail. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‘s dismissal of Glover‘s FDCPA and FCEUA claims 
against the Udren Defendants. 
                                                                                                     
FCEUA incorporates ―any violation of the FDCPA,‖ the 
FCEUA states that such a violation must be committed by a 
―debt collector,‖ for which it provides a definition that 
departs from that contained in the FDCPA.  We will respect 
this legislative choice. 
